Warning-response problem

Understanding the security failures of September 11, 2001 and studying subsequent homeland security developments are important research areas that deserve careful scholarly attention. This project investigates the question of why so many policymakers were caught off guard by the September 11, 2001 attacks and examines the key factors that contribute to vulnerability and inhibited vigilance. Through an empirical exploration of three broad explanatory “cuts” derived from the relevant inter-disciplinary literature on policy failure—psychological, bureau- organizational, and agenda-political—Eric Stern and Charles Parker attempt to shed light on the sources of failure that may have contributed to the events of September 11.

The three analytical cuts performed in the two articles this project has produced (Parker and Stern, 2002; Parker and Stern, 2005- see Scientific journal articles) revealed that to the extent that the U.S. was surprised on September 11, it was due in large measure to a number of interrelated psycho-political processes that produced a pattern of denial and distraction. Psychological factors contributed to the overvaluation, overconfidence, insensitivity to criticism, and wishful thinking regarding existing policies and practices. Bureau- organizational arrangements, dynamics, and procedures produced a fragmented organizational structure, a lack of adequate cooperation and coordination, and standard practices that left the homeland vulnerable to terrorists eager and able to exploit these opportunities. Finally, the lack of an adequate counterterrorism and homeland defense policy should be seen as the result of an overcrowded policymaking agenda, threat-framing failures by key actors, and medium-low prioritization by several successive presidential administrations. As a result the government failed to develop the strategy, policies, or capabilities needed to confront catastrophic terrorism.

The insights drawn from the study of September 11, rather than being applicable only to the United States, have a generic value to decision-makers and are applicable far beyond the narrow subject of avoiding terrorist attacks.

As such, this research should be relevant not only to those interested in the United States, but also to many other countries and especially Sweden.

One of the goals of this project is to suggest and develop an analytic framework that can be used to conduct process-oriented research as well as enhance our knowledge regarding the complexities and challenges of policymaking. Armed with practical knowledge about the warning-response failures and surprises (and non-surprises) of the past, leaders and security policymaking institutions in many countries can be better sensitized to detect and deal with the threats and potential policy failures of today and tomorrow. Thus, the implications of this research apply at both a social scientific and a science-policy level.

This three-cut analytical framework developed to investigate 9/11 is also being applied by CRISMART researchers to better understand failures surrounding Hurricane Katrina.